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Protecting National Security through
More Liberal Admission of Immigrants
Kevin R. Johnsont

Commentators and pundits have repeated the mantra "September 11 changed everything" so often in the last six years that
the phrase has lost nearly any and all meaning. One cannot deny
that that fateful day, with the tragic loss of human life, has unquestionably altered U.S. society and the way that Americans
look at the world. As a response to the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration adopted stringent security
measures, including mass arrests, interrogations, and indefinite
detentions.' Outside the United States, in addition to wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. government engaged in detentions, and at times even torture and abuse, of prisoners. 2 Those
t Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, School of Law, University of California,
Davis, Mabie-Apallas Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies; A.B., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., Harvard University. Small sections of this article are
adapted from Kevin R. Johnson, Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink
Its Borders and Immigration Laws (forthcoming NYU 2007). Michael A. Olivas provided
helpful comments on a draft of this article. Thanks to the editors of the University of
Chicago Legal Forum for organizing this symposium and issue and for inviting me to
participate.
1 See Part I.
2 See, for example, Michael P. Scharf & Rory T. Hood, The Elephant in the Room:
Foreword: Torture and the War on Terror, 37 Case W Res J Intl L 145, 145-46 (2006)
(summarizing the aggressive actions taken by the executive, and suggesting that "more
and more Americans [have begun] to wonder if the United States government [has] gone
too far in the name of national security"); Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U Pa L
Rev 2085, 2085-86 (2005) (discussing the Abu Ghraib scandal, and arguing that the executive branch self-consciously created "a space so freed from the constraints of law and
decency that abuse became possible, even, perhaps inevitable"); Diane Marie Amann,
Guantdnamo, 42 Colum J Transnatl L 263, 263 (2004) (looking to the norms of international and human rights law because "no constitutional precedent controls resolution,"
and arguing that the "[r]eported conditions of detention and interrogation, as well as the
proposal for trial before special tribunals, may violate core guarantees of the U.S. Constitution"); Sanford Levinson, In Quest of a "Common Conscience": Reflections on the Current
DebateAbout Torture, 1 J Natl Sec L & Pol 231, 240-46 (2005) (exploring the complexities
involved in attempting to define "torture"); Marcy Strauss, The Lessons ofAbu Ghraib,66
Ohio St L J 1269, 1271 (2005) (suggesting five lessons that should be learned from Abu
Ghraib: 1) "moral ambiguity toward torture inevitably leads to the commission of torture;
anything less than absolute, unequivocal condemnation ... invites the use of torture"; 2)
limiting the use of torture to "extreme situations ...does not work"; 3) "torture is an
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whom the President designated "enemy combatants" were afforded precious few legal protections. 3 In the name of national
security, the government assumed increased powers to more eas4
ily intrude upon the privacy of citizens and immigrants.
When it comes to immigration law and policy, September 11
had especially dramatic consequences. Terrorism fears led the
U.S. government to impose tighter immigration restrictions in
many areas, from stricter scrutiny and monitoring of foreign
scholars and students 5 to new, more restrictive immigration requirements and procedures targeting Arab and Muslim noncitizens, including "special" registration requirements, detentions,
and selective removals. 6 Many of the policies, however, were not
limited to Arabs and Muslims; rather, they affected other groups
ineffective way to obtain valuable information"; 4) benefits derived from torture are outweighed by harms engendered; and 5) the debate must be about the definition of torture).
Consider Natsu Taylor Saito, From Exclusion to Guantdnamo Bay (Colorado 2007) (tracing history of extraordinary U.S. government power over noncitizens from the Chinese
exclusion laws in the late 1800s to the modern "war on terror" after September 11, 2001).
3 See, for example, Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 126 S Ct 2749, 2759 (2006) (holding that
military tribunals created by the Bush administration violated both the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and Article III of the Geneva Convention); Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US
507, 510 (2004) (ruling that a U.S. citizen held as an "enemy combatant" had the right to
a hearing to challenge that classification). See also Rumsfeld v Padilla,542 US 426, 430
(2004) (finding that the court in which the action was filed lacked jurisdiction over the
defendant to entertain a challenge to the detention of a U.S. citizen classified as an "enemy combatant").
4 See, for example, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ('USA PATRIOT Act"), Pub L No
107-56, 115 Stat 272 (2001). For criticism of the USA PATRIOT Act, see, for example,
David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 Stan L Rev 953, 966-74 (2002) (discussing how the Act
"makes noncitizens deportable for wholly innocent associational activity, excludable for
pure speech, and detainable on the Attorney General's say-so, without a hearing and
without a finding that they pose a danger or a flight risk"); Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose
Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of COINTELPRO and the
Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 Or L Rev 1051, 1111-28 (2002) (describing
post-9/1l measures taken by the government). Due to political pressures based on civil
liberties concerns, Congress amended the law to narrow governmental powers before its
renewal. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, Pub L No 109-177,
120 Stat 192 (2006).
5 See Michael A. Olivas, The War on Terrorism Touches the Ivory Tower-Colleges
and Universities After September 11: An Introduction, 30 J Coll & Univ L 233 (2004)
(describing the effect of the USA PATRIOT Act and other legislation on immigrant students and faculty); Victor C. Romero, Noncitizen Students and Immigration Policy Post9/11, 17 Georgetown Immig L J 357 (2003) (examining the effects of recent and thenpending legislation on noncitizen students); Eugene McCormack, Total GraduateEnrollments Rise; Number of Foreign Students Drops, 52 Chron of Higher Educ A38 (Nov 11,
2005), available at <http://chronicle.com/weekly/v52/i12/12a03801.htm> (last visited Apr
4, 2007) (noting that, while overall enrollment increased by 2 percent in 2004, international student enrollment dropped 3 percent). See also Congressional Research Service,
Foreign Students in the United States: Policies and Legislation (updated Oct 11, 2006)
(outlining various legal issues facing foreign students in the United States).
6 See text accompanying notes 46-50.
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of immigrants as well. 7 Indeed, a vocal group of observers and
policymakers claimed that the fear of another terrorist attack
required increased enforcement along the southern border with
Mexico, thereby deeply influencing the national debate over immigration reform that began in 2005.8
In retrospect, one member of Congress aptly lamented that
the necessary pursuit of national security should not have
been used ...to enact unrelated and radical changes in
immigration laws under the guise of preventing terrorism.
Unfortunately, members of Congress have abused arguments for national security to enact hundreds of radical
changes in immigration laws.... Instead of enacting rational immigration reform that will indeed strengthen our
national security, Congress has enacted immigration
changes that have very little or nothing to do with national security. [Republican] revolutionaries "revolutionized" the American tradition of immigration but, unfortunately, did not bring revolutionary change to protecting
America from terrorists.9
The U.S. government evidently believed it appropriate to
sacrifice civil rights, especially those of foreigners, to protect the
security of the nation. 10 But a critical question remains: are we a
safer nation today because of the various immigration measures
enacted by the U.S. government since September 11? According
to a majority of the American public, the answer to this question
is "probably not."11 Nonetheless, as part of the war on terror,
calls persist for increased border enforcement and nothing less
than monumental efforts to fence, fortify, and close the U.S. border with Mexico.12 Little can be gained in terms of security, however, through restrictionist laws and policies that cannot effectively be enforced at the ground level. To make matters worse,
7 See text accompanying notes 56-78.
8 See text accompanying notes 51-54.
9 U.S. Representative Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of Radical Change in Immigration
Law: An Inside Perspective, 16 Stan L & Pol Rev 349, 377-78 (2005).
10 See David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standardsand ConstitutionalFreedoms in
the War on Terrorism 4-5 (New 2003) (describing post-September 11 measures targeting
undocumented immigrants, and providing examples of comparable measures taken during other times in U.S. history, followed by suggestions as to how similar measures might
be avoided in the future).
11 See text accompanying note 55 (discussing public opinion poll on the subject).
12 See text accompanying notes 51-52.
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such arbitrary, overbroad, and unfair laws alienate immigrant
communities and foreign governments whose assistance is vital
to the U.S. government in its fight against global terrorism.
Unrealistic immigration laws, in place for decades, have
forced millions of people to evade the law in order to enter and
remain in the United States and, once here, have forced them to
remain in the recesses of American social life. As President
George W. Bush aptly observed in calling for immigration reform
in 2006, "illegal immigrants live in the shadows of our society....
[T]he vast majority.., are decent people who work hard, support
their families, practice their faith, and lead responsible lives.
They are part of American life, but they are beyond the reach
13
and protection of American law."
This article contends that, even assuming such a policy outcome were possible, efforts to improve the nation's security need
not-and, in fact, should not-include closing the borders and
deporting all undocumented immigrants from the United
States. 14 Put differently, a more open society need not be a country whose national security is more at risk than one with nominally closed borders. In fact, a number of informed commentators
have proposed more flexible immigration admission systems that
would better ensure national security than the regime currently
in place. 15 To improve security, the United States needs a more
reasonable immigration admissions system that better matches
the political, social, and economic factors contributing to immigration, a system that does not encourage circumvention of the
law and the creation of a shadow population of millions of peo16
ple.
13 Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform, 42 Weekly Comp Pres Docs 924, 931
(May 15, 2006) (emphasis added).
14 Indeed, the evidence in my estimation suggests that it is not possible. See Part II.
15 See, for example, Bill Ong Hing, Misusing Immigration Policies in the Name of
Homeland Security, 6 New Centennial Rev 195, 207-16 (2006) (suggesting, among other
things, that national security may be improved by adoption of better intelligence strategies and the legalization of undocumented immigrants in the United States); Jan Ting,
Immigration Law Reform After 9/11: What Has Been and What Still Needs to Be Done, 17
Temple Intl & Comp L J 503, 512-15 (2003) (contending that current immigration formulas for admission are too rigid in light of the developments since September 11 and that
the U.S. government needs greater flexibility to deal with changing social, political, and
economic circumstances).
16 See Kevin R. Johnson, Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink Its
Borders and Immigration Laws (forthcoming NYU 2007). See also Bill Ong Hing, Deporting Our Souls: Values, Morality, and Immigration Policy 162-63 (Cambridge 2006) ("A
smart approach to national security is one that reaches out to noncitizen communities...
because they are allies in protecting our homeland. [Immigrants bring] economic and
social benefits ... to our nation" and "[t]argeting noncitizens of a certain ethnic, religious,
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Depending on the source, somewhere between 10.5 and 12
million undocumented immigrants live in the United States today. 17 Rather than engaging in futile efforts to close the border,
the United States needs to address the economic realities currently fueling immigration and contributing to the growing number of people who live in this country in contravention of U.S.
immigration laws. Generations of migrants from Mexico have
made their way to the United States.1 8 Legally or illegally, immigrants will continue to come to this country for jobs and to reunite with family members. Thousands of migrants today literally risk life and limb to come to this land of freedom and opportunity. 19 The current immigration status quo demonstrates that
or racial background or closing our borders to newcomers or visitors is a national security
strategy that does not make our country safe.").
17 See Jeffrey S. Passel, The Size and Characteristicsof the Unauthorized Migrant
Population in the U.S. (Pew Hispanic Center 2006), available at <http://pewhispanic.org/
reports/report.php?ReportID=61> (last visited Apr 4, 2007) (estimating that, as of March
2006, the undocumented immigrant population in the United States was between 11.5
and 12 million). The U.S. government's estimates generally have been lower than those of
independent groups. In January 2005, the federal government estimated that 10.5 million
undocumented persons lived in the United States compared to 8.5 million in January
2000. See Office of Immigration Statistics, United States Department of Homeland Security, Estimates of the Unauthorized Population Residing in the United States: January
2005 214 (Nov 2006), available at <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/
publications/ILLPE_2005.pdl$ (last visited Apr 4, 2007).
18 See Gerald P. L6pez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L Rev 615, 641-72 (1981) (providing a detailed history
of immigration from what is now Mexico to the United States, beginning with the Spanish explorers in the decade after Hernin Cortez's conquest of the Aztecs, and ending with
the migration patterns of the late 1970s); Joanne D. Spotts, U.S. Immigration Policy on
the Southwest Borderfrom Reagan Through Clinton, 1981-2001, 16 Georgetown Immig L
J 601 (2002) (describing more recent migration patterns).
19 Increased border operations in major border hubs, such as El Paso, Texas and San
Diego, California, beginning in the 1990s, funneled migrants into deserts and mountains
where deaths increased. For a sampling of literature analyzing the deadly impacts of
greater border enforcement, see Timothy J. Dunn, The Militarizationof the U.S.-Mexican
Border, 1978-1992: Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home (Texas 1996); Karl
Eschbach, Jacqueline Hagan, and Nestor Rodriguez, Causes and Trends in Migrant
Deaths Along the U.S. -Mexico Border, 1985-1998 (2001), available at <http://www.uh.edu/
cir/Executive Summary.pdl$ (last visited Apr 4, 2007) (discussing the effects of increased
border enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico border); Joseph Nevins, Operation Gatekeeper:
The Rise of the "IllegalAlien" and the Making of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary 10 (Routledge
2002) (describing the Clinton administration's effort known as "Operation Gatekeeper,"
its sources, and how, given its historical context, the U.S. boundaries and social practices
accompanying these boundaries have made such efforts seem "increasingly normal and
unproblematic"); Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended
Consequences of US Immigration Control Policy, 27 Population & Development Rev 661
(2001) (analyzing the consequences, including significant numbers of deaths, of increased
border enforcement efforts); Karl Eschbach, et al, Death at the Border, 33 Intl Migration
Rev 430 (1999) (documenting evidence of more than 1,600 deaths from 1993-1997 resulting from increased border enforcement); Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 UC Davis J Intl L & Pol 121, 123 (2001) (discussing deaths resulting from Op-

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2007:

it makes no sense to simply continue fortifying the borders and
engaging in the futile effort to keep all undocumented immi20
grants out of the country.
A proposal to liberalize admissions to protect national security may seem counter-intuitive. But, as this article contends, a
carefully crafted, liberal admissions scheme could lead to a more
secure nation. Such an immigration system initially would need
to bestow lawful immigration status on the millions of undocumented immigrants already residing in the United States. In
addition, the current systems to track lawful immigrants and
temporary visitors, which are woefully inadequate, need to be
improved. 2 1 We have many residents effectively living off the
books and not readily identifiable in any way. Basic information
about all immigrants in the United States is necessary for effective law enforcement-criminal as well as immigration-and will
better serve national security and public safety interests.
Put simply, the United States needs a more realistic immigration scheme that does not result in massive violations of the
law and the creation and maintenance of a shadow population of
millions of people. Previously, I have equated the current immigration laws and their enforcement with the failed Prohibitionera anti-alcohol laws. 22 In both instances, enforcement of the law
failed and, to make matters worse, resulted in widespread negative collateral consequences, thereby undermining the law's very
23
legitimacy.
Part I of this article looks at the current border restrictions
in the United States, with a focus on those ostensibly based on
national security concerns. Part II contends that less restrictive
admissions would contribute to a more secure America. The artieration Gatekeeper); Guillermo Alonso Meneses, Human Rights and Undocumented Migration Along the Mexican-U.S. Border, 51 UCLA L Rev 267, 281 (2003) (contending that
the U.S. and Mexican governments share equal responsibility for the deaths of immigrants at the border); Jorge A. Vargas, U.S. Border Patrol Abuses, Undocumented Mexican Workers, and InternationalHuman Rights, 2 San Diego Intl L J 1, 5 (2001) (criticizing the "erroneous laissez faire attitude of the U.S. government regarding the problem of
constant, but irregular, migratory flows of Mexican undocumented workers into [the
U.S.]").
20 See text accompanying notes 26-30.
21 See text accompanying notes 102-03.
22 See Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L Rev 193, 245-52 (2003) (noting
that "[a]lthough the analogy is far from perfect, migration controls resemble in significant
ways the United States' efforts to enforce the bar on alcohol trade during prohibition,"
and concluding "law cannot be effectively enforced when it faces social and economic
resistance and the governed do not view as criminal what the law criminalizes").
23 See Part II A.
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cle argues that U.S. immigration laws must be radically reformed to be more consistent with the economic, social, and political pressures fueling modern migration to the United States.
I. IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY SINCE SEPTEMBER 11
IN THE UNITED STATES: BORDER ENFORCEMENT AND

MORE BORDER ENFORCEMENT
Recent years have seen increasingly aggressive efforts by the
U.S. government to seal its borders, almost exclusively focused
on the southern border with Mexico. 24 Nevertheless, a large, and
by virtually all accounts growing, undocumented populationmore than half from Mexico-lives in the "shadows" of the
United States. As many as twelve million undocumented immi25
grants today reside in this country.
Increased border enforcement efforts over the last fifteen
years, to the surprise of many, have been accompanied by a significant increasein the size of the undocumented population. One
study concluded that "[t]here is no evidence that the border enforcement build-up ... has substantially reduced unauthorized
border crossings" and that "[d]espite large increases in spending
and Border Patrol resources over the past nine years, the number of unauthorized immigrants increased to levels higher than
those" before 1986.26 In that year, Congress passed a reform law
that, besides granting amnesty to hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants, provided for the imposition of sanctions
on the employers of undocumented immigrants; Congress hoped
27
to avoid the emergence of a new undocumented population.
The fact that there are so many undocumented immigrants
in the United States confirms what we all know-that the immigration laws are routinely violated and, at least as currently configured, are effectively unenforceable. Undocumented workers
know that if they are able to make the often-arduous journey to
24 See note 19 (citing authorities).
25 See note 17 (citing statistics on undocumented immigration).
26 Belinda I. Reyes, Hans P. Johnson, and Richard Van Swearingen, Holding The
Line? The Effect Of The Recent Border Build-Up On Unauthorized Immigration viii, xii
(Pub Pol Inst of Cal 2002).
27 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 609-10,
1209-14 (Foundation 4th ed 2005) (explaining the workings of the legalization and employer sanctions provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986). For
critical analysis of the effectiveness of employer sanctions, consider Michael J. Wishnie,
Prohibitingthe Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U
Chi Legal F 193.
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the United States, they can obtain work and that the job will pay
more than most workers would have been able to earn in their
native countries. Employers greatly demand the labor of undocumented workers. A drive to one of the many day-laborer
pick-up points in cities and towns across the country clearly
28
demonstrates this fundamental truth.
In modern times, U.S. immigration enforcement has proven
to be the equivalent of tilting at windmills. 29 We simply cannot
keep determined migrants-so determined that they are willing
to risk their lives-from unlawfully entering the country. In addition, the current computer systems in place are woefully incomplete and poorly track immigrants who have lawfully entered
the United States. 30 Thus, even for noncitizens who enter
through legal channels, the country lacks reliable systems to
track who is here, who is not, when they entered, and when they
left (if they did). Given the technology available in the information age, such a result is unacceptable.
Moreover, the U.S. government has made few efforts to remove noncitizens that lawfully entered the country on temporary
visas, such as students and tourists, but overstayed their terms.
Visa overstays, as they are known, likely constitute somewhere
between 25 and 40 percent of the undocumented population. 31 In
the last few years, however, interior enforcement of the immigration laws has been reduced, not increased. Indeed, at least
through the halfway point of President Bush's second term, the
28 For studies of day laborers, see Abel Valenzuela, Jr., et al, On the Corner: Day
Labor in the United States (Jan 2006), available at <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/csup/
index.php> (last visited Apr 4, 2007) (discussing the daily lives of day laborers and the
conditions they face); Abel Valenzuela, Jr. and Edwin Melendez, Day Labor in New York:
Findings From the NYDL Survey (Apr 2003), available at <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/
issr/csup/pubs/papers/pdf/csup3_execsumm.pdf> (last visited Apr 23, 2007) (same, but
with a focus on the New York market).
29 See Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policingthe U.S.-Mexico Divide (Cornell 2000)
(analyzing the difficulties and limitations of border enforcement combined with the primary benefits accruing to politicians pursuing border enforcement strategies).
30 See Visa Overstays: Can We Bar the Terrorist Door?, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations, 109th Cong, 2d Sess 185 (2006) (statement of Margaret D. Stock) (listing U.S. Government Accountability Office studies noting various deficiencies in computerized immigrant tracking systems used by the Department of Homeland Security); Think All Illegal
Immigrants Are Sneaking In? Think Again: Years After 9/11, Government Still Can't
Track All Who Overstay Visas, USA Today 12A (May 2, 2006) (identifying flaws in current
tracking system); Nicole Gaouette, U.S. Installs Visitor Tracking Stations: The US-VISIT
Program to Collect Information on Incoming Foreignersand Screen Them Steps Toward
Full Operation,LA Times A17 (Dec 31, 2005) (to the same effect).
31 See Passel, The Size and Characteristicsof the Unauthorized Migrant Population
in the U.S. at 18 (cited in note 17).
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Bush administration made workplace enforcement a low priority.
In 1999, only 240 full-time employees in the entire United States
were devoted to workplace enforcement of the immigration laws;
by fiscal year 2003, the number had dropped precipitously to
90.32 The number of employers prosecuted for employing undocumented immigrants dropped from 182 in 1999 to 4 in 2002;
in 1999, the U.S. government imposed fines against 417 compa33
nies but against only 3 in 2004.
Beginning in late 2006, the Bush administration engaged in
34
a series of highly publicized immigration raids in workplaces. It
is unclear whether the raids will remain part of long-term U.S.
immigration enforcement policy or were simply part of a temporary political strategy designed by the administration to help
convince Congress that enforcement measures might work and
that comprehensive immigration reform, including an earned
legalization and guest worker program, should be seriously con35
sidered.
The limited nature of interior enforcement in the United
States is in some ways understandable. The political resistance
from employers as well as immigrant rights advocates makes
such enforcement politically hazardous. 36 However, increased
32 See United States Government Accountability Office, Immigration Enforcement:
PreliminaryObservations on Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts 3
(June 21, 2005).
33 Id at 4. See also Spencer S. Hsu and Kari Lydersen, Illegal Hiring is Rarely Penalized; Politics, 9/11 Cited in Lax Enforcement, Wash Post Al (June 19, 2006) (citing the
same statistics).
34 See Erika Hayasaki, Mayor Criticizes Raid for DisruptingFamilies: Immigration
Arrests in Massachusetts Stranded 140 Youths. Sixty Workers Have Since Won Humanitarian Releases, LA Times A16 (Mar 9, 2007) (describing Immigration and Customs Enforcement raid at factory in Massachusetts); Julia Preston, Immigration Raid Draws
Protest From Labor OfficialsNY Times A17 (Jan 26, 2007) (recounting Immigration and
Customs Enforcement raid at North Carolina pork-packing plant and discussing union
support for immigrants); Julia Preston, Immigrants' Families FiguringOut What to Do
After Federal Raids, NY Times A13 (Dec 16, 2006) (reporting on a raid in Colorado and
immigrants' fear following the raid).
35 See Gail Russell Chaddock, Capitol Hill Closes in on Immigration Reform: Proposed Bills Would Create a Guest-Worker Program and a Path to Citizenship for Illegal
Immigrants, Christian Sci Monitor 1 (Mar 13, 2007) (noting "critics say the stepped-up
enforcement is aimed more at finding votes [for immigration reform] on Capitol Hill than
ferreting out wrongdoers"); Another Round on American Immigration Reform, The Economist.com, The Economist Intelligence Unit Viewswire (Mar 14, 2007) (noting that
"[b]usiness lobbies are pushing for [immigration reform] harder than ever. This is the
result in part of stepped up raids in recent weeks and months on workplaces .. "),available at <http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid
=894664&story-id=ElRRQVPTJ> (last visited April 27, 2007).
36 See Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration
Enforcement, 2006 U Ill L Rev 887, 935-44 (noting that "while employers are well positioned to serve as gatekeepers, their economic interests often clash significantly with
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border enforcement, without any effort to regulate the availability of jobs to undocumented immigrants, will ultimately do little
to change the status quo. Jobs and superior economic opportunity in the United States are the primary magnets attracting
immigrants to this country. The continued availability of such
opportunity will continue to fuel immigration.
A.

Crossing Borders After September 11

The U.S. government's understandable preoccupation with
terrorism since September 11, 2001 arguably makes this an inopportune historical moment to raise the possibility of reducing
immigration controls and easing entry of immigrants into the
United States. The horrific events of that day understandably
raised legitimate national security and public safety concerns in
this country. Indeed, terrorism has affected the entire world, and
led to military conflicts causing the deaths of thousands of civil3 7
ians as well as combatants in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Not surprisingly, in the name of national security, the highest levels of the U.S. government engaged in a sustained effort to
close, not open, the borders. 38 In line with that effort, the public
grew more supportive of tighter immigration restrictions after
New York City's World Trade Center crumbled to the ground.3 9
good-faith compliance"); Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The
Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 Harv CR-CL L Rev 345, 359-61
(2001) (analyzing the decreased use of employer sanctions by the INS). See also Michael
J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U Pa J Lab & Emp L 497,
516-21 (2004) (noting that the federal government has only recently begun to avoid involving itself in labor disputes, which often involve employer retaliation against immigrants reporting poor labor conditions).
37 See Simon Reeve, And You Call This Winning, Mr President?; War on Terror Five
Years on 50,000 Civilians Dead... 3,092 UK and US Forces Killed, The Mirror 16 (Oct 7,
2006) (discussing the vast amounts of money spent on, and the tens of thousands of lives
lost in, the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts).
38 See The Aftermath of September 11: A Chronology, 79 Interpreter Releases 1359
Appendix I (Sept 9, 2002) (providing a chronology of the Bush Administration's immediate legal responses to the events of September 11, 2001). See also Viet D. Dinh, Freedom
and Security After September 11, 25 Harv J L & Pub Pol 399, 401 (2002) (stating that,
"[t]o respond to [the] threat of terrorism, the Department [of Justice] has pursued an
aggressive and systematic campaign that utilizes all available information, all authorized
investigative techniques, and all legal authorities at our disposal').
39 See Margaret Graham Tebo, The Closing Door: U.S. Policies Leave Immigrants
Separate and Unequal, ABA J 43, 47 (Sept 2002) (discussing immigration policy before
and after September 11, and noting a "scattershot of changes" after that date). See also
Michele R. Pistone, A Times Sensitive Response to Professor Aleinikoff's Detaining Plenary Power, 16 Georgetown Immig L J 391, 399-400 (2002) (observing that, after September 11, the nation moved from contemplating more liberal admissions to considering
policy options and controls that would enhance security). Restrictionist and nativist outbursts in response to social stress often have been especially virulent at the state and
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Specifically, the public has generally backed government antiterrorism efforts that tend to focus on Arabs and Muslims,
whether or not the measures constitute racial and religious profiling, which is generally disfavored in today's political culture in
the United States. 40 At first glance, this all may seem entirely
understandable. After all, noncitizens, all of whom were Muslim,
perpetrated the terrorist acts of September 11.41 But not all Muslim noncitizens are terrorists, and the immigration measures
targeting this group were overbroad as well as discriminatory.
In no small part because the law allows the government
great latitude in its policies toward immigration and immigrants,
immigration law has served as a convenient domestic foundation
for the U.S. government's so-called "war on terror."42 Put differently, immigration proved to be a handy anti-terrorism tool after
September 11 as the Bush administration felt compelled to act
decisively in a high profile manner. The deference that courts
show to the immigration decisions of the political branches facilitated the aggressive action by Congress and the Executive
Branch and ensured minimal interference by the courts.
For example, the plenary power doctrine shields many Executive Branch and Congressional immigration decisions from

local levels. See Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances:
Preemption, Prejudice, and the ProperRole for Enforcement, 2007 U Chi Leg F 27. Consider also Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and
Alienage Classifications,35 Va J Intl L 217 (1994) (arguing for adherence to the general
rule that state regulation of immigration is preempted by federal law). After September
11, much violence was directed at Arabs and Muslims. See Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage
Shared by All: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 Cal L Rev
1259, 1265-77 (2004) (providing examples of private violence as well as public official
involvement, and public acquiescence, in racial profiling after September 11); Bill Ong
Hing,Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanizationof Immigrant America, 7 Mich J Race &
L 441 (2002) (offering examples of violence and harassment directed at Americans of
Muslim, Middle Eastern, and South Asian descent after September 11).
40 See Susan M. Akram and Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration
Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 NYU Ann Surv
Am L 295, 351-55 (2002) (discussing racial profiling in the enforcement of immigration
law after September 11).
41 See National Commission on Terrorist Acts Upon the United States, The 9/11
Commission Report 145-253 (2004) (outlining September 11 plot).
42 See, for example, Karen Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on Terror(ism), 75 U Colo L Rev 59, 63 (2004) (suggesting that dichotomies between "good" and "bad" aliens have served to legitimize the "restrictions on
freedom and foreign policy decisions that are designed (or asserted) to pursue the war");
Teresa Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After
September 11th, 25 BC Third World L J 81, 85-86 (2005) (arguing that the war on terror
has further blurred the distinction between criminal punishment and immigration law,
and that a social control function now pervades immigration law enforcement).
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meaningful judicial review. 4 3 Although the doctrine has been
much-maligned in light of the constitutional revolution over the
last century, 44 it remains the law of the land. Indeed, as recently
as 2003, the Supreme Court invoked the plenary power doctrine
in upholding the detention of criminal aliens pending their re45
moval from the United States.
The many opportunities offered by the plenary power doctrine have not been lost on the U.S. government in responding to
the events of September 11, 2001. For example, in promulgating
the regulations allowing for special immigration procedures, including requiring certain (primarily Arab and Muslim) noncitizens to report and register with the Immigration & Naturalization Service, Attorney General John Ashcroft emphasized that
[t]he political branches of the government have plenary
authority in the immigration area. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80-82
43 See, for example, INS v Abudu, 485 US 94, 110 (1988) ("[INS] officials must exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations,
and therefore the reasons for giving deference to agency decisions ... apply with even
greater force in the INS context."); Fiallo v Bell, 430 US 787, 792 (1977) (refusing to disturb gender preferences in immigration admission criteria, and noting that "[t]his Court
has repeatedly emphasized that over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of
Congress more complete than it is over the admission of immigrants") (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); Mathews v Diaz, 426 US 67, 81 (1976) (contending
that deference to the U.S. government on immigration matters was justified in part because "decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers"). The
doctrine was spawned in the Supreme Court's decision upholding one of a series of laws
providing for the general exclusion of Chinese immigrants from the United States. See
Chae Chan Ping v United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 US 581, 606 (1889).
See also Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership 50 (Princeton 2006) ("American courts describe the immigration power as 'plenary' in
character, by which they mean that the judiciary has virtually no authority to scrutinize
what the political branches do in this domain."); Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States 174 (Oxford 2006)
("Noncitizens can be arrested, detained, and deported under immigration law with little
recourse to the constitutional protections that would limit the government outside of
immigration.").
44 See, for example, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and American Citizenship 5 (Harvard 2002) (arguing that "a constitutional
law for the twenty-first century needs understandings of sovereignty that are supple and
flexible ... [y]et our constitutional law, at least as declared by the Supreme Court, is
moving in the opposite direction"); Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the ConstitutionImmigrants, Borders, and FundamentalLaw 51 (Princeton 1996) (criticizing the plenary
power doctrine, and suggesting "it is anachronistic to project this modern constitutional
doctrine into the earlier period"); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race
Discriminationand the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L Rev 1, 1 (1998)
(arguing that the plenary power cases were decided by the same court that decided Plessy
v Ferguson, and based on principles "emphatically rejected by the Court since Brown v
Board of Education").
45 See Demore v Kim, 538 US 510, 521-22 (2003).
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(1976). In the context of immigration and nationality
laws, the Supreme Court has particularly "underscore[d]
the limited scope of judicial inquiry." Fiallo, 430 U.S. at
792.46
The law affords considerable latitude to the government in
the realm of immigration, especially when national security is
involved. Immigrants effectively possess a smaller bundle of
rights that the government must respect under the law than do
U.S. citizens. In the wake of September 11, the U.S. government
arrested, interrogated, detained, and removed from the country
thousands of Arab and Muslim noncitizens. 4 7 The government
46 Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed Reg 52584, 52585
(Aug 12, 2002) (emphasis added). Even if the plenary power doctrine did not preclude
review, there might be a debate over whether the U.S. Constitution applied to the various
measures taken by the U.S. government in the war on terror. See Bruce Ackerman, The
Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L J 1029 (2004) (arguing for a new constitutional regime in which the discretion of the executive is limited during times of emergency). But
see Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 Stan L Rev
605, 643 (2003) (arguing for continued judicial deference "to political branches during
wartime and other emergencies"); Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency (Oxford 2006) (arguing for flexibility in the interpretation of the Constitution in evaluating security measures in a time of national emergency).
47 For a sampling of criticism of the various measures, see Raquel Aldana-Pindell,
The 9/11 "NationalSecurity" Cases: Three Principles Guiding Judges' Decision-Making,
81 Or L Rev 985, 995-96 (2002) (advocating new principles to replace the "mixed" responses of the courts to detention practices in cases that implicate national security concerns); Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial ProfilingAfter September 11, 34 Conn L Rev 1185, 1186 (2002) (describing experiences of noncitizens after arrest); Thomas W. Joo, PresumedDisloyal: Executive
Power, Judicial Deference, and the Construction of Race Before and After September 11,
34 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 1, 3 (2002) (noting the history of presumptions regarding the
disloyalty of those in the "Oriental" racial categories, and arguing that the "war on terrorism" is invoking similar categorical assumptions); Victor C. Romero, Decoupling "Terrorist" From "Immigrant" An Enhanced Role for the Federal Courts Post 9/11, 7 J Race,
Gender, & Just 201, 204 (2003) (arguing that "[olverreliance on [the] immigration power
underestimates citizen threats while heightening [the] marginalization of outsiders");
Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist,49 UCLA L Rev 1575, 1576 (2002) ("September
11 facilitated the consolidation of a new identity category that groups together persons
who appear 'Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim"'). A plethora of reports have documented
the civil and human rights abuses in the "war on terror." See, for example, Muzaffar A.
Chishti, et al, America's Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil Liberties, and National Unity
After September 11 (Migration Policy Institute 2003); Tram Nguyen, We Are All Suspects
Now: Untold Stories From Immigrant Communities After 9/11 (Beacon 2005); Office of
the Inspector General, United States Department of Justice, The September 11 Detainees:
A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the
Investigation of the September 11 Attacks (Apr 2003); Office of the Inspector General,
United States Department of Justice, Supplemental Report on September 11 Detainees'
Allegations of Abuse at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York (Dec
2003); Office of the Inspector General, United States Department of Justice, Report to
Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA PatriotAct (2003).
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took the extraordinary step of implementing a special registration system for noncitizens in the United States from a select
group of nations, resulting in many arrests, detentions, and deportations of Arabs and Muslims. 48 Although the special registration program-since discontinued-was criticized as impermissible racial profiling, 49 courts rejected constitutional challenges to
the program. 50 To add insult to injury, special registration, and
the many other related security measures, did not appear to
yield many, if any, discernible security benefits.
Incendiary arguments continue to be made about the need to
close the borders to all immigrants in support of the war on terror. 51 The "close the border" approach has been applied to un-

documented immigrants who evade inspection, even though, by
all accounts, not one of the September 11 terrorists entered without inspection. In the modern discussion of immigration in the
United States, undocumented immigration is often characterized

48 See note 46 (citing regulation creating program).
49 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and We the People After September 11, 66 Alb
L Rev 413, 420-21 (2003) (calling for a coherent understanding of immigration and citizenship decisions to prevent the campaign against terrorism from dividing the nation);
Heidee Stoller, et al, Developments in Law and Policy: The Costs of Post-9/11 National
Security Strategy, 22 Yale L & Pol Rev 197, 220-22 (2004) (analyzing the history of the
special registration program and its reliance on racial profiling); Ty S. Wahab Twibell,
The Road to Internment: Special Registration and Other Human Rights Violations of
Arabs and Muslims in the United States, 29 Vt L Rev 407, 527-35 (2005) (identifying
problems generated by racial profiling in immigration enforcement). See also Kathryn
Lohmeyer, Note and Comment, The Pitfalls of Plenary Power: A Call for Meaningful
Review of NSEERS "Special Registration" 25 Whittier L Rev 139 (2003) (advocating
judicial review of special registration program).
50 Roudnahal v Ridge, 310 F Supp 2d 884, 892 (ND Ohio 2003). See also Kandamar v
Gonzales, 464 F3d 65, 69-74 (1st Cir 2006) (rejecting argument that evidence obtained
through special registration should be suppressed based on constitutional violations, and
concluding that any error that occurred was harmless); Ali v Gonzales, 440 F3d 678, 68182 (5th Cir 2006) (finding, in removal case, that special registration did not violate Equal
Protection guarantee, and, even if it did, any error would be harmless). There was some
precedent supporting the special registration program. In the Iranian hostage crisis during the Carter administration, the courts upheld special immigration regulations applicable only to Iranian students. See Narenji v Civiletti, 617 F2d 745 (DC Cir 1979). For criticism of this approach, see, for example, Peter E. Quint, The Separationof Powers Under
Carter,62 Tex L Rev 785, 856 (1984) ("Narenji is troublesome because an executive classification based on nationality in a foreign affairs crisis will overvalue the government
interest and undervalue the individual constitutional interest.!).
51 See, for example, Patrick J. Buchanan, State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America (St Martin's 2006); Michelle Malkin, Invasion: How America Still Welcomes Terrorists, Criminals, and Other Foreign Menaces To Our Shores
(Regnery 2002). See also Jan C. Ting, Unobjectionable but Insufficient-FederalInitiatives
in Response to the September 11 TerroristAttacks, 34 Conn L Rev 1145 (2002) (questioning, in a more balanced manner, whether the United States had done enough in the "war
on terrorism").
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as a terrorism risk. 52 As Professor Enid Trucios-Haynes observed,
[i]mmigration dominates policy discussions in the postSeptember 11, 2001 world in a manner that has distorted
traditional issues and concerns relating to noncitizens. To
some, the perception or reality of porous U.S. borders requires the most strenuous methods of border enforcement.
In the eyes of many, immigration reform proposals since
2001 have focused exclusively on enforcement without sufficient acknowledgment of the human consequences on the
noncitizens, both authorized and unauthorized, through53
out our community.
In a comment typical of the tenor of the modern debate over immigration reform, Senator John Cornyn in 2006 emphasized that
the national dialogue on immigration reform is "first and foremost about our Nation's security. In a post-9/11 world, border
54
security is nationalsecurity."
In sum, the flexibility in the law did not deter, and perhaps
even encouraged, the U.S. government to target immigrants in
the war on terror. The courts, for the most part, declined to intervene. Despite hyper-aggressive efforts directed at Arabs and
Muslims in the name of fighting terrorism, a majority of Americans do not feel that the nation is any safer today than before
September 11.55
B.

Collateral Impacts

Unfortunately, the war on terror has been used to rationalize an array of aggressive policies tightening immigration laws
having little to do with national security and public safety. For
example, in the name of fighting terrorism, the Department of
Justice announced that it would begin enforcing a rule allowing
52 See Kris W. Kobach, The QuintessentialForce Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of
Local Police to Make ImmigrationArrests, 69 Albany L Rev 179, 179 (2005).
53 Enid Trucios-Haynes, Civil Rights, Latinos, and Immigration: Cybercascades and
Other Distortions in the Immigration Reform Debate, 44 Brandeis L J 637, 638 (2006)
(emphasis added).
54 152 Cong Rec S 2551, 2552 (Mar 30, 2006) (Senator Cornyn) (emphasis added).
65 See Poll: 1 in 4 Americans Believe U.S. Was Safer Before 9/11, CNN.com (Aug 23,
2006), available at <http://www.cnn.com/2006[US/08/23/terror.poll/index.html>
(last
visited Apr 4, 2007) (reporting survey results that 43 percent of those polled thought that
the United States is safer now than it was before the September 11 attacks, while 25
percent believe it is less safe now than before the attacks).
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for the deportation of immigrants who fail to report their change
of address within ten days of moving.56 Attorney General John
Ashcroft threatened to deport terrorists for "spitting on the sidewalk." 57 He also found that national security concerns justified
the detention of an otherwise ordinary Haitian asylum seeker
without bond even though the noncitizen in question had no
links whatsoever to terrorism: in his words,
there is a substantial prospect that the release of such
aliens into the United States would ... encourage future
surges in illegal migration by sea. ... [Such s]urges.. injure national security by diverting valuable Coast Guard
and [Department of Defense] resources from counterterror58
ism and homeland security responsibilities.
One court invoked concerns with terrorism to justify a run-ofthe-mill border check at a port of entry along the U.S.-Mexico
border that escalated into the tearing apart of a spare tire in the
59
search for drugs.
Previously condemned in law enforcement, racial, ethnic,
and religious profiling became a centerpiece of the war on terror. 60 But racial profiling in this context has many of the same
flaws identified in the ordinary criminal law enforcement context. These include, but are not limited to, embarrassment, humiliation, and related dignitary injuries resulting from being the
focus of an unjustified criminal investigation based on impermissible racial stereotyping. As Steve Legomsky has emphasized,
profiling in law enforcement must be rational and "any gains in
the efficacy or efficiency of the inspection process must be balanced against the substantial harms of government-sponsored
discrimination." 61 The benefits of racial profiling in the war on
terror are far from certain while the costs have been great.
56 Jonathan Peterson, Noncitizens Must Report If They Move; Immigration: The Justice Department Citing a 50-year-old Law, Demands Notification Within 10 Days of Moving. Penalty Could be Deportation,IA Times Al (July 23, 2002).
57 Philip Shenon and Don Van Natta, Jr., U.S. Says 3 Detainees May Be Tied to Hijackings, NY Times Al (Nov 1, 2001).
58 In re D-J-, 23 INS Dec 572, 579 (BIA 2003) (emphasis added). See Judy Amorosa,
Note, Dissecting In re D-J-: The Attorney General, Unchecked Power, and the New National Security Threat Posed by HaitianAsylum Seekers, 38 Cornell Intl L J 263 (2005)
(analyzing the ruling).
59 See United States v Cortez-Rocha, 394 F3d 1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir 2005).
60 See Akram and Johnson, 58 NYU Ann Surv Am L at 351-55 (cited in note 40).
61 Stephen H. Legomsky, The Ethnic and Religious Profiling of Noncitizens: National
Security and InternationalHuman Rights, 25 BC Third World L J 161, 179 (2005).
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Profiling, security checks, and removal campaigns resulted
in record levels of deportations, with almost all of the noncitizens
having nothing whatsoever to do with terrorism. Importantly,
the vast majority of the record numbers of immigrants deported
since September 11 have been citizens of Mexico and Central
America, who comprise a large segment of the undocumented
and legal immigrant population in the United States. Similarly,
citizenship requirements for security personnel at airports implemented after September 11 affected many more Latina/o and
62
Asian immigrants than Arab or Muslim ones.
Fears over a repeat of September 11 have served as a convenient excuse for more punitive immigration law enforcement
proposals, and pursuit of an ardently restrictionist immigration
agenda. As mentioned previously, proposals for increased border
enforcement along the U.S. border with Mexico have been
claimed to be necessary to improve national security. 63 But there
is little evidence to suggest that there is a realistic threat of terror from Mexico. Indeed, one study found that "[n]ot one terrorist
has entered the United States from Mexico." 64 Oddly enough,
there has been little focus on the U.S. border with Canada despite the fact that a bona fide terrorist, the Millennium bomber,
was apprehended seeking to enter the United States from the
65
north.
While the war on terror has dominated the national and international consciousness, constructive immigration reform efforts have, to this point, fallen by the wayside. Serious discussions of a bilateral agreement regularizing migration between
the United States and Mexico ended abruptly on September 11.66
Efforts to remove the punitive edges of the 1996 immigration
62 See Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants:CollateralDamage
Comes Home, 52 DePaul L Rev 849, 852-65 (2003) (discussing harmful impact antiterrorism immigration legislation and policies have had on Mexican immigrants).
63 See text accompanying notes 51-54.
64 Peter Beinart, The Wrong Place to Stop Terrorists, Wash Post A25 (May 4, 2006)
(discussing study making this finding). For the study itself, see Robert S. Leiken and
Steven Brooke, The QuantitativeAnalysis of Terrorism and Immigration: An Initial Exploration, 18 Terrorism and Polit Violence 503, 503 (2006) ("Despite media alarms about
terrorists concealed in the illegal traffic crossing the Mexican border, not a single [person
charged or convicted of terrorist acts, or killed in such acts] entered from Mexico.") (footnote omitted).
65 See Sam Howe Verhovek, 2nd Man Sought for Questioning in Bomb Plot, NY
Times 42 (Dec 19, 1999) (reporting that terrorism suspect came into the United States
across the Canadian border); Scott Sunde & Elaine Porterfield, Wider Bomb Plot Possible:
Suspect Was Heading Toward Seattle, and Then London, Seattle Post-Intelligencer Al
(Dec 18, 1999) (same).
66 See Johnson, 52 DePaul L Rev at 866-67 (cited in note 62).
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reform laws-described by one influential observer at the time to
be perhaps as "radical" as any in U.S. history 67-also evaporated
on that day. The political climate made any liberalization of the
immigration laws next to impossible, at least in the short run. 68
Over the last few years, President Bush's efforts to reopen discussion of immigration reform, and his advocacy of a guest
worker program, faced strong resistance from the restrictionist
wing of the Republican Party. 69 The Mexican government also
failed in its efforts to move the United States forward in jointly
70
addressing migration between the two nations.
Beginning in 2005, the nation has been engaging in an extended, and fractious, national debate over reform of the immigration laws, with a special focus on undocumented immigration
from Mexico. In December 2005, the House of Representatives
passed a severe enforcement-oriented bill, known as the Sensenbrenner bill, 71 which provoked protests of thousands of people on
the streets of cities across the United States. 72 The Senate passed
a more moderate alternative, which included legalization and
67 See, for example, Peter H. Schuck, Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens 143
(Westview 1998) (characterizing the 1996 reforms as "the most radical reform of immigration law in decades--or perhaps ever").
68 See Johnson, 52 DePaul L Rev at 866-67 (cited in note 62).
69 See Barbara Hines, So Near Yet So Far Away: The Effect of September 11th on
Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 8 Tex Hisp J L & Pol 37 (2002); Johnson, 52
DePaul L Rev at 866-67 (cited in note 62).
70 See Johnson, 52 DePaul L Rev at 866-67 (cited in note 62). See also Kevin R.
Johnson and Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security after September
11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 Minn L Rev 1369, 1387-94 (2007)
(discussing need for multilateral responses by nations of North America to common security and immigration issues).
71 Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, HR
4437, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (2005). The Sensenbrenner bill, among other things, would
have made the mere status of being an undocumented immigrant a felony subject to imprisonment as well as deportation from the United States, and would have imposed
criminal sanctions on persons who provided any sort of humanitarian assistance to undocumented immigrants. See id at §§ 203 and 205. For a summary of the myriad of immigration reform proposals floated in Congress over the last few years, see Hing, Deporting
Our Souls at 17-38 (cited in note 16).
72 See Teresa Watanabe Hector Becerra, 500,000 Pack Streets to ProtestImmigration
Bills: The Rally, Part of a Massive Mobilization of Immigrants and Their Supporters,May
Be the Largest L.A. Has Seen, LA Times Al (Mar 26, 2006); Mark Johnson and Linda
Spice, Thousands March for Immigrants: "A Day Without Latinos"Seeks to Flex Political
Muscle in Divisive Debate, Milwaukee J Sentinel Al (Mar 24, 2006); Nathaniel Hoffman,
Protest Supports Illegal Workers, Contra Costa Times (Mar 22, 2006); Oscar Avila and
Antonio Olivo, A Show of Strength: Thousands March to Loop for Immigrants' Rights Workers, Students Unite in Opposition to Toughening of Law, Chi Trib Al (Mar 11, 2006).
For an analysis of the impacts of the marches, including the possibility that they signify
the emergence of a new civil rights movement, see Kevin R. Johnson and Bill Ong Hing,
The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 Harv CR-CL L Rev 99 (2007).

157]

IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

175

guest worker components in addition to enhanced immigration
enforcement measures.7 3 Ultimately, the controversy ended with
Congress failing to enact anything akin to comprehensive immigration reform in 2006 but only passing a law authorizing the
extension of the fence along the U.S.-Mexican border.7 4 Congress
did so even though there is no evidence that the extension of the
border fence-or any other border enforcement-only measurewill decrease the number of undocumented immigrants in the
75
United States.
The post-September 11 period unfortunately brought with it
a serious distortion of the immigration debate. Restrictionists
effectively capitalized on fear in an effort to persuade Congress
to pass tough border enforcement measures. 76 The war on terror
derailed reasoned discussion of ordinary immigration reform,
with any proposal to liberalize the immigration laws challenged
77
vociferously as endangering national security.
To this point, although necessary, truly comprehensive immigration reform has proven to be politically impossible. At least
in 2006-07, an election year, tough measures like border fences
proved much more likely to carry the day than comprehensive
approaches addressing the United States' true immigration
needs and realities. Things, of course, may change should a na78
tional consensus on immigration reform emerge in the future,
which may be more likely-but is by no means assured-now
that Democrats control the U.S. Congress.

73 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S 2611, 109th Cong, 2d Sess
(2006).
74 See Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub L No 109-367, 120 Stat 2638 (2006). As this
article went to press, it appeared that a push for immigration reform also failed in 2007.
75 See text accompanying notes 25-29 (discussing failure of increased border enforcement to reduce undocumented immigrant population).
76 See text accompanying notes 51-54.
77 See Hing, Deporting Our Souls at 140-63 (cited in note 16) (suggesting that closing
the United States' borders to "newcomers or visitors" will not make the nation safer);
Jennifer M. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and
National Sovereignty, 39 Conn L Rev (forthcoming 2007). See also Johnson and Trujillo,
Immigration Reform, 91 Minn L Rev at 1396-1404 (cited in note 70) (analyzing how the
"war on terror" distorted the debate over immigration reform).
78 For an optimistic view of the possibilities for comprehensive immigration reform in
the near future, see Tamar Jacoby, Immigration Nation, 85 Foreign Aff 50 (2006).
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II. LIBERAL ADMISSIONS WOULD RESULT IN A
MORE SECURE UNITED STATES

Historically, U.S. immigration laws have been dramatically
overbroad in attacking the perceived evil of the day, whether it
be racial minorities, the poor, political dissidents, or other undesirables. 79 Today, "terrorists" and undocumented immigrants are
the stated targets of immigration law and its enforcement. To be
effective, the war on terror should attempt to exclude from admission the true dangers to national security and public safety,
rather than engage in the doomed effort to seal the borders to all
migrant workers, which has proven to be virtually impossible.
The intuitive reaction to the suggestion of liberalizing immigration admissions is that the United States cannot open the
floodgates to poor and working people from all over the world.
Such fears today are exacerbated by concerns with terrorism. It
is often assumed that if the U.S. were more liberal in admitting
immigrants, the nation would be overrun with migrants; terrorists would come to the United States with the masses.8 0 Liberal
admissions therefore might hurt national security. That, however, is not necessarily the case.
In my estimation, the floodgates concerns are greatly overstated. Most people the world over would prefer to stay put in
their native lands. As one commentator observed,
Most people have no inclination to leave their native soil,
no matter how onerous conditions become. Would-be emigrants must fight off the ties of family, the comfort of familiar surroundings, the rootedness in one's culture, the
security of being among "one's own," and the power of
plain inertia. Conversely, being uprooted carries daunting
79 See, for example, Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather'sStories, and
Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 SLU L J 425, 43239 (1990) (recounting history of harsh treatment of Chinese and Mexican immigrants in
U.S. history); Kevin R. Johnson, The Forgotten "Repatriation"of Persons of Mexican Ancestry and Lessons for the 'War on Terror" 26 Pace L Rev 1 (2005) (analyzing "repatriation" of persons of Mexican ancestry, including U.S. citizens, during the Great Depression). Consider John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism
1860-1925 (Rutgers 3d ed 1994) (documenting a lengthy episode in this nativist history);
Kevin R. Johnson, The "Huddled Masses" Myth: Immigration and Civil Rights 13-108
(Temple 2004) (analyzing history of exclusions and deportations of racial minorities,
political dissidents, poor, and sexual minorities under U.S. immigration law); Ronald
Takaki, Strangers From a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (Little, Brown
1989) (documenting history of harsh treatment of Asian immigrants in the United
States).
80 See note 51 (citing authorities).
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prospects: adjusting to alien ways, learning a new language, the absence of kith and kin, the sheer uncertainty
of it all.81
Most Mexicans, for example, prefer to-and in fact do--stay
in Mexico. The mass migration feared in the expanding European Union, which generally permits labor migration between
member nations, has not come to pass.8 2 The ease of travel between U.S. states (and the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico), despite
economic disparities between the states and territories, has not
led to mass migration from poorer to richer regions. Even if they
would encourage greater migration, realistic immigration laws
that are effectively enforced might improve, not undermine, the
security of the nation. Immigration laws that better fulfill the
nation's labor needs would eliminate a powerful incentive to circumvent the law for employers and migrants and would allow for
government to have better information about the identities of all
the nation's residents.
A.

Why Liberal Admissions in an Age of Terror?

Suppose the U.S. embraced immigration laws that made it
easier to lawfully immigrate to the United States. In a forthcom-

81 Alan Dowty, Closed Borders: The ContemporaryAssault on Freedom of Movement
223 (Yale 1987). See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and
Equality 38 (Basic 1983) ("[Most hiuman beings ... are ... inclined to stay where they
are unless their life is very difficult there."). See also Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 Rev Pol 251, 270 (1987) (arguing that "borders should
generally be open . . . subject only to the sorts of constraints that bind current citizens in
their new country"). As Ruben G. Rumbaut observed,

[ift never ceases to surprise me that, in a world of 6.5 billion people, 98 percent
are "stayers,"living in the country of their birth; that the remaining two percent,
international migrants of a bewildering variety of origins, migration motives,
and modes of adaptation to their new environments, are at heart ambitious, determined, and intrepid souls, which is what makes migration the "selective"
process that it is; and that, all things considered, so little focused attention is
paid to either of those two facts.
What Surprised You Most About Migration in 2005? Top Experts Respond (Migration
Policy Institute Dec 1, 2005) (emphasis added), available at <http://www.
migrationinformation.org/USfocus/print.cfm?ID=361> (last visited Apr 4, 2007). By way
of example, consider the deep reluctance of a refugee family to leave war-torn Ethiopia as
described in Mawi Asgedom, Of Beetles and Angels: A True Story of the American Dream
(Megadee 2001).
82 See World Bank EU8, QuarterlyEconomic Report Part II: Special Topic September
2006-Labor Migration From the New EU Member States (World Bank 2006), available at
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECA/Resources/EU8QERSeptember2OO6-Special
TopicFINAL.pdf> (last visited Apr 4, 2007).
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ing book, which expands on a law review article,8 3 I propose
minimal border controls that, consistent with the concern for national security and public safety, would be much narrower in
scope than those found in current U.S. immigration laws.8 4 Efforts would be made to bar hardened criminals, those reasonably
suspected of terrorist activities, and those posing public health
risks from entering the United States. By targeting a small
group of noncitizens from entering the country, immigration authorities would deny admission to true threats to our national
security and public safety. Law-abiding noncitizens seeking nothing more than to work in the United States would find admission
much easier than they do under current U.S. immigration law.
The idea of permeable borders as the foundation for U.S.
immigration law may well be a pipe dream. Nonetheless, for purposes of this article, consider the possibility of more liberal immigration laws than the United States currently has, even if the
borders are not completely opened, and the impacts of such laws
on national security.
Contrary to popular intuition, liberal admissions policies
that better fulfill the demand for labor in the United States and
minimize the undocumented population are entirely consistent
with efforts to protect the nation from terrorist acts. More liberal
migration with fewer time-consuming bureaucratic paperwork
requirements would allow the U.S. government to focus its enforcement efforts on the true dangers to public safety and national security.8 5 Rather than detailed checks on mundane matters, such as income levels of the migrants and their sponsors,
U.S. immigration authorities could limit their inquiry to denying
admission to terrorists, dangerous criminals, drugs and other
contraband, and public health risks. With a true national security emphasis in immigration enforcement, there would no longer
be a need to engage in the endless search for a reason to keep
every noncitizen out of the country, which is how U.S. immigration laws tend to be currently enforced. Enforcement efforts
could move beyond the morass of visa requirements, exclusion
grounds, per country ceilings, and the many complexities of the

83 See Johnson, Open Borders? at 263-65 (cited in note 22).
84 See Johnson, Opening the Floodgatesat 51-60 (cited in note 16).
85 See Judith Golub, ImmigrationReform Post-9/11, 13 US-Mex L J 9, 14 (2005) ('If
a dysfunctional law is enforced, and if the only policy created serves to strengthen enforcement, then the result will simply be more dysfunction.").
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Immigration and Nationality Act8 6 that have also made its en89
88
forcement difficult,8 7 as well as ineffective and unfair.
To make matters worse, the United States lacks an immigration bureaucracy that effectively and efficiently enforces the
law and commands the respect of the public. Respect and legitimacy lag in no small part due to the fact that the immigration
laws are routinely violated because they are not realistic. Narrower, more realistic laws are more likely to be effectively enforced and generate respect and legitimacy for the agency enforcing them.
In addition, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS"), which until the spring of 2003 had primary responsibility for enforcing the immigration laws, has long been criticized as
inefficient, arbitrary, and incompetent. The agency focused almost exclusively on enforcement, not service.90 In essence, the
INS lacked the confidence of the public and respect in many
quarters.
Criticism of the INS's competence hit a fever pitch when the
agency mailed visa renewals to two September 11 hijackers
months after their deaths. 91 This inexplicable and indefensible
86 Pub L No 414, 66 Stat 163 (1952), codified as amended in 8 USC §§ 1101-1524.
87 See Castro-O'Ryan v INS, 847 F2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir 1988) ("With only a small
degree of hyperbole, the immigration laws have been termed 'second only to the Internal
Revenue Code in complexity."').
88 See text accompanying note 17 (discussing the millions of undocumented immigrants in the United States).
89 Consider, for example, Bernard Trujillo, Immigrant Visa Distribution: The Case of
Mexico, 2000 Wis L Rev 713 (showing how per country ceilings of less than 26,000 per
year on certain immigrant admissions from a single country in any year apply to all nations but have a disproportionate impact on prospective immigrants from Mexico, and
noncitizens from several other developing nations, because demand for immigration from
there for reasons of proximity, jobs, and family ties, greatly exceeds the annual ceiling).
See also Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Equality and Diversity, 31 Colum J Transnatl L 319, 321 (1993) (commenting on disparate racial impacts of per country ceilings);
Jan C. Ting, "Other Than a Chinaman" How U.S. Immigration Law Resulted From and
Still Reflects a Policy of Excluding and Restricting Asian Immigration, 4 Temple Polit &
Civ Rts L Rev 301, 309 (1995) (same).
90 See Nancy Morawetz, Understandingthe Impact of the 1996 DeportationLaws and
the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 Harv L Rev 1936, 1948-50 (2000) (discussing
the aggressive enforcement practices of the INS); Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal
Representation For Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 Conn L
Rev 1647, 1698-1700 (1997) ("The INS has long struggled to balance its 'service' and
'enforcement' functions, and to reign in its far-flung and recalcitrant field functions.").
Because of the deep-seated problems in the immigration bureaucracy, the blue ribbon
United States Commission for Immigration Reform, chaired by former Congresswoman
Barbara Jordan, recommended major structural reforms. See United States Commission
for Immigration Reform, Becoming an American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy
147-203 (1997).
91 See Elizabeth A. Palmer and John Godfrey, Sensenbrenner Leading the Charge for
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error contributed significantly to the congressional push to reorganize the immigration bureaucracy and to create the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), which assumed most of the
U.S. government's immigration functions.
Despite the reorganization, the DHS, to this point, appears
as enforcement-oriented as the old INS. Nor has there been any
dramatic improvement in bureaucratic efficiency with the dismantling of the INS. 92 Unless the DHS learns to better balance
its enforcement and service functions, pouring more and more
resources into a dysfunctional agency is hardly likely to improve
things. Specifically, paying for more Border Patrol officers without improving training is likely to make matters worse, not better.

93

1. Liberal admissions would encourage better adherence to
the immigration laws.
A system that allows for easier migration of labor to the
United States would likely decrease the incentive for circumventing the immigration laws. Narrower exclusion grounds in the
U.S. immigration laws would be more enforceable than the current blanket exclusions that, for example, bar the immigration of
Immediate INS Overhaul: Belated Visa Approval Notification for Sept. 11 Terrorists Has
Congress Clamoring for Control of the ImmigrationAgency, 60 Cong Q Weekly 705 (Mar
16, 2002), available at <http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreportl07-0000003986
40> (last visited Apr 4, 2007).
92 For criticism of the Department of Homeland Security's handling of immigration
matters, see M. Isabel Medina, Immigrants and the Government's War on Terrorism, 6
New Centennial Rev, 225, 230-32 (2006). See also Victor Romero, Race, Immigration,and
the Department of Homeland Security, 19 St John's J Legal Commen 51, 52 (2004), observing:
[That to the extent that the nation's immigration powers will be placed under
the Department of Homeland Security suggests to me that any existing racial
stereotypes regarding immigrants will be perpetuated rather than diminished.
Put simply, post-9/11, the age-old stereotype of the foreign, Arab terrorist has
been rekindled, and placing our immigration functions under the auspices of an
executive department charged with "homeland security" reinforces the stereotype of the "immigrant as terrorist."
13 See Gabriela A. Gallegos, Comment, Border Matters: Redefining the National Interest in U.S.-Mexico Immigration and Trade Policy, 92 Cal L Rev 1729, 1757-58 (2004)
(stating that 1996 immigration reform law failed to ensure adequate training in light of
"the Border Patrol's checkered history of abuse in the Southwest") (footnote omitted);
Ruchir Patel, Immigration Legislation Pursuant to Threats to US National Security, 32
Denver J Intl L & Pol 83, 97 (2003) (criticizing USA PATRIOT Act for increasing the
number of Border Patrol agents but failing to ensure better training). The Border Patrol
frequently has been accused of physically and otherwise abusing immigrants in its border
enforcement activities. See Johnson, Open Borders? at 222 nn 165-67 (cited in note 22)
(citing authorities).
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poor and working people from the developing world for no other
94
reason than that they are poor and working people.
With relaxation of the exclusion grounds, the nation could
devote scarce enforcement resources to efforts to bar the entry
into the United States of criminals, terrorists, and other dangers
to society. Such a true security and public safety emphasis in the
enforcement of the immigration laws would make the United
States much safer than the current diffused, unfocused enforcement emphasis that has pervaded U.S. border controls and their
enforcement since the early twentieth century.
With a more liberal immigration admission scheme, complex
inquiries into migrants' family histories, incomes, and purposes
for entering the country, could be made for the most part irrelevant to the U.S. government. Such inquiries today are the breadand-butter of border enforcement officers and the bane of immigrants who are subject to lengthy visa applications, consular officer interviews, immigration stops, and document checks. 95 Time
and effort would be saved in the vast majority of immigrant admissions, with time better spent on the relatively few cases involving serious criminal and terrorist activities-the very cases
that deserve careful attention by a government seeking to protect
the safety of its citizens.
As seen in other areas of law enforcement, more focused enforcement of immigration laws has a greater likelihood of rooting
out unlawful conduct than scattershot efforts that infringe on the
civil rights of many people, 96 even if they are "only" noncitizens
whose rights are not highly valued in the political process. Consider that racial profiling by police has done little to make the
nation's streets safer but has alienated, angered, and injured the
94 See Immigration & Nationality Act § 212(a)(4), 8 USC § 1182(a)(4) (2000) (providing that "[alny alien ... likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible").
Consider Johnson, The "Huddled Masses" Myth at 91-108 (cited in note 79) (analyzing
history of excluding poor and working noncitizens from the United States). For statistics
for fiscal year 2002 showing that the public charge exclusion was by far the substantive
ground (as opposed to procedural grounds, such as an incomplete application, for example) most frequently relied upon in denial of an immigrant visa by the State Department,
see Department of State, Report of the Visa Office at Table XX: Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visa Ineligibilities (2003), available at <http://travel.state.gov/visa/about/report/
report 1476.html> (last visited Apr 4, 2007).
95 See Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy at 444-95 (cited in note
27) (summarizing admission procedures for immigrants).
96 See Kevin R. Johnson, U.S. Border Enforcement: Drugs, Migrants, and the Rule of
Law, 47 Vill L Rev 897, 916-19 (2002) (noting how policy change limiting discretion had
improved customs enforcement and that many states and municipalities were limiting
police discretion through policies designed to reduce racial profiling).
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very communities whose cooperation is needed to effectively fight
crime. 97 Similarly, immigration enforcement that is carefully
crafted is less likely to frighten immigrant communities-the
very communities whose assistance is essential if the United
States truly seeks to successfully fight global terrorism. Unfortunately, the war on terror has frightened Arabs and Muslims
living in the United States and no doubt discouraged them from
cooperating with the government in counterterrorism efforts. 98
Most importantly, a system in which illegal migration is reduced-and the undocumented population in the United States is
legalized-would allow for improved tracking of all noncitizens
living in the United States. If that occurred, the nation would be
far better positioned to maintain records, including names and
addresses, of all immigrants in the country. Currently, millions
of undocumented immigrants live and work in this country, without much governmental knowledge about them. 99 We know precious little about who they are and where they live, much less
what they are doing in the United States. It is difficult to see
how the existence of a shadow population of millions of people
could in any way be in the national interest, especially in a time
when national security concerns are at their zenith. Nor is there
any evidence that the U.S. government as a practical matter
could end undocumented immigration under the current laws
and remove all of the undocumented immigrants from the country.1 00
2. More liberal admissions would dampen the likelihood of
the emergence of a new undocumented immigrant population.
Despite great increases in resources devoted to sealing the
border, increased border enforcement has failed to reduce the
undocumented immigrant population in the United States. Nor

97 See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While
Black" Matters, 84 Minn L Rev 265, 298-300 (1999) (noting how differently whites and
blacks view the criminal justice system and suggesting that the racial profiling of African-Americans contributes to the difference in views).
98 See Akram and Johnson, 58 NYU Ann Surv Am L at 327-55 (cited in note 40) ("In
a time when Arab and Muslim communities might be of assistance in investigating terrorism, they are being rounded up, humiliated, and discouraged from cooperating with
law enforcement by fear of arrest, detention, and deportation.").
99 See text accompanying note 17.
100 See Johnson, Open Borders? at 245-52 (cited in note 22).
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does the U.S. government truly enforce the immigration laws in
the interior of the country.
It seems highly unlikely that tighter enforcement of the immigration laws with mass removals would meaningfully reduce
the undocumented immigrant population. Despite record levels
of deportations in the years since September 11,101 officials at the
highest levels of the U.S. government recognize that removal of
all undocumented immigrants is simply not possible. In 2004,
Undersecretary of the Department of Homeland Security Asa
Hutchinson candidly admitted that it is 'not realistic"' to believe
that all undocumented immigrants can be removed from the
country and, in any event, doubted that "the American public has
the 'will . . . to uproot' those aliens." 10 2 In 2006, President George
W. Bush himself acknowledged that .'[m]assive deportation of
10 3
the people here is unrealistic. It's just not going to work."'
The cost of the massive campaign needed to deport all undocumented immigrants from the United States would break the
federal budget. A 2005 study estimated that it would cost $41
billion a year for five years to fund a serious effort to remove all
undocumented immigrants from the country. It further concluded that
While the net benefits of adopting such a policy are largely
speculative, we do know that spending $41 billion annually over five years ($206 billion in total) would:
Exceed the entire budget of the Department of Homeland Security for FY 2006 ($34.2 billion);
Approach the total amount of money required by the
33 federal agencies responsible for homeland security
activities for FY 2006 ($49.9 billion);
More than double annual spending on border and
transportation security ($19.3 billion);
Comprise half the annual cost of the Iraq War ($74
billion); and
101 See Michael Chertoff Holds a Briefing on the Secure Border Initiative, Cong Q
Transcriptions (Aug 23, 2006) (offering estimate that the U.S. government would engage
in a record number of removals for the fiscal year).
102 Jerry Seper, Rounding Up All Illegals "Not Realistic" Wash Times Al (Sept 10,
2004) (quoting Hutchinson).
103 Elisabeth Bumiller, In ImmigrationRemarks, Bush Hints He Favors Senate Plan,
NY Times A22 (Apr 25, 2006) (quoting President Bush).
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More than double the annual cost of military operations in Afghanistan ($16.8 billion). 10 4
Currently, many undocumented immigrants live in the
United States. The nation needs to regularize the status of longterm residents and enact a set of laws that will avoid the creation of such a population in the future. Put simply, because mass
removals are not possible, the nation needs a realistic legalization program. And it needs sensible immigration admissions criteria to avoid the emergence of a new undocumented immigrant
population.
3. Liberal admissions would minimize other adverse consequences of current immigration enforcement.
There are many other collateral consequences of current
U.S. enforcement of unrealistic immigration laws. Increased border enforcement has resulted in deaths, as migrants have resorted to more dangerous routes to the United States than in the
past in an effort to evade immigration enforcement officers concentrated at major border hubs such as El Paso, Texas and San
Diego, California. 10 5
In addition, millions of undocumented immigrants seek to
evade the law, which has resulted in the emergence of highly
organized criminal networks that pose true risks to national security. 10 6 In no small part due to tighter immigration enforcement, the trafficking of human beings is big business and a
growth industry, with its tentacles reaching across the entire
United States. Thriving international criminal syndicates, which
dominate the trafficking industry, profit handsomely.
Misery and death often directly result from human trafficking. Some immigrants able to survive the journey are effectively
enslaved to pay off smuggling fees, with thousands of immigrant
women forced into the sex industry and other exploitative work
104 Rajeev Goyle and David A. Jaeger, Deporting the Undocumented: A Cost Assessment 1 (Center for American
Progress July 2005), available at <http://
www.americanprogress.org/kf/deporting-the-undocumented.pdf>
(last visited Apr 4,
2007) (some emphasis added).
105 See note 19 (citing authorities).
106 Consider Jennifer M. Chac6n, Misery and Myopia: Understandingthe Failures of
U.S. Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 Fordham L Rev 2977 (2006) (analyzing generally the modern problem of trafficking of immigrants into the United States) and Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 BU L Rev 157 (2007).
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arrangements. 10 7 The trafficking of human beings-with its devastating impacts-flows immediately from heightened immigration enforcement.
Immigration enforcement has more general labor market
consequences. There have been increasing reports of slavery and
involuntary servitude of immigrants in the United States.1 0 8
Immigration enforcement also has less extreme negative impacts
on the labor market. Many undocumented workers are exploited
in the workplace 0 9 and lack basic legal protections. 110 The failure
to enforce wage and condition laws encourages employers to exploit undocumented workers and to avoid hiring U.S. citizens
and lawful immigrants in certain sectors of the economy.
Because many undocumented immigrants are people of
color, a racial caste exists in the U.S. labor market. The large
undocumented population harkens back to the days of slavery
and Jim Crow in the United States, with a racial caste of workers subject to exploitation and abuse in the secondary labor market. More realistic immigration laws and policy, which would
minimize the size of the labor market composed of workers lack-

107 Consider Rosy Kandathil, Global Sex Trafficking and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000: Legislative Responses to the Problem of Modern Slavery, 12 Mich J
Gender & L 87 (2005) (describing the failures of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of
2000 ("TVPA"), and providing suggestions for making the Act more effective); Susan W.
Tiefenbrun, Sex Slavery in the United States and the Law to Stop it Here and Abroad, 11
Wm & Mary J Women & L 317 (2005) (to the same effect); Susan W. Tiefenbrun, The
Domestic and InternationalImpact of the U.S. Victims of Trafficking Protection Act of
2000: Does Law Deter Crime?, 2 Loyola Chi Intl L Rev 193 (2005) (analyzing the effectiveness of the TVPA).
108 See Human Rights Center, Freedom Denied: Forced Labor in California1 (Berkeley 2005). Consider Free the Slaves & Human Rights Center of the University of California, Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the United States, 23 Berkeley J Intl L 47 (2005).
See, for example, Michael A. Scaperlanda, Human Trafficking in the Heartland: Greed,
Visa Fraud, and the Saga of 53 Indian Nationals "Enslaved" by a Tulsa Company, 2
Loyola Chi Intl L Rev 219 (2005) (analyzing trafficking of skilled workers from India by
unscrupulous employer).
109 See Ruben J. Garcia, Across the Borders: Immigrant Status and Identity in Law
and LatCrit Theory, 55 Fla L Rev 511, 515-19 (2003) (outlining the weak legal protections for immigrants in the workplace); Maria L. Ontiveros, To Help Those Most in Need:
Undocumented Workers' Rights and Remedies Under Title VII, 20 NYU Rev L & Soc
Change 607, 617-23 (1993-94) (focusing on the difficult experiences of immigrant women
in the workplace); Donna E. Young, Working Across Borders: Global Restructuring and
Women's Work, 2001 Utah L Rev 1 (same).
110 See, for example, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc v NLRB, 535 US 137 (2002)
(holding that an undocumented immigrant lacked full legal rights to backpay from employer who discharged worker because of his union organizing activities); Espinoza v
FarahMfg Co, 414 US 86 (1973) (holding that discrimination against job applicant based
on lack of U.S. citizenship status was not prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
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ing basic legal protections, would tend to minimize the troubling
labor market consequences of the current system.
4. Conclusion
As it turns out, effectively closing the borders to undocumented immigrants simply is not a likely or realistic policy alternative. Neither is deporting all undocumented immigrants
from the United States. Consequently, we as a nation must then
consider how to better deal with the undocumented population
living and working in this country. The current treatment of the
undocumented worker is simply indefensible morally, legally,
and as a matter of public policy.
B.

Improving National Security Through Realistic Immigration
Law and Policy

Philip Heymann, an expert in national security, sets forth
three goals in designing strategies to improve the security of the
United States and address the threat of terrorism in the future:
(1) reducing the probability and harm of terrorism; (2) calming
public fear and anger; and (3) respecting civil rights.' Consideration of each goal proves useful in evaluating the U.S. government's use of immigration law and policy as a counterterrorism
device.
1. Minimizing the threat of terrorism.
As all would no doubt agree, the United States needs an
immigration system that reduces the probability and harm of
terrorism. The events of September 11 demonstrate that terrorists can skillfully exploit weaknesses in the U.S. immigration
system. Almost all of the terrorists involved in the airplane hijackings entered the United States lawfully on nonimmigrant
visas. 112 This fact suggests the need for better visa monitoring,
which has been a continuing-but uncompleted-project of the
U.S. government. 113 Given that most of the terrorists entered the
country lawfully on temporary visas, it is curious that one of the
U.S. government's most visible responses to September 11 has
Il See Philip Heymann, Terrorism,Freedom and Security: Winning Without War 8890 (MIT 2003).
112 See National Commission on Terrorist Acts Upon the United States, The 9/11
Commission Report at 145--253 (cited in note 41).
113 See text accompanying note 30.
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been to try to close the borders to undocumented immigrants,
especially those from Mexico, a country not known to be a haven
114
for terrorists.
Liberal admissions, with screening focused on true dangers
to U.S. society, are unlikely to dramatically increase illegal entry
by terrorists, which is difficult, expensive, and dangerous. With a
liberal admission system, the flow of illegal entrants would be
reduced and those who are attempting to enter without inspection would be more likely to pose a security risk (thus justifying
the imposition of strict border enforcement measures). Currently,
much of the traffic of undocumented immigrants is composed of
otherwise law-abiding migrants seeking work in the United
States who lack a legal avenue for admission.
A number of concrete steps could be taken to ensure that the
immigration laws help to minimize the threat of terrorism. Importantly, the laws could be narrowed so that the noncitizens
excluded were in fact threats to the national security or public
safety. Better security and background checks could be required
before allowing a noncitizen entry into the United States.
Grounds for exclusion could focus on denying entry to terrorists,
criminals, and diseased immigrants, not overbroad attempts at
prohibiting admission of most poor and working noncitizens.
In addition, better tracking of all noncitizens in the United
States is an important first step toward improving national security.1 15 Improved visa monitoring is consistent with more liberal
admissions. Once noncitizens enter the country on valid visas,
we could ensure that they are in compliance with those visas and
have lawful purposes for remaining in the country.
2. Calming the public.
The United States requires a new-and-improved immigration system that instills faith and confidence in the public at
large. The long, sordid history of the INS has done much to contribute to a serious lack of confidence in, and respect for, the nation's immigration laws and their enforcement.11 6 To that end,
the nation also must ensure that immigration enforcement
avoids alienating the immigrant communities whose very assistance must be enlisted in the fight against terrorism." 7 The
See text accompanying notes 63-65.
115 See text accompanying note 30.
116 See Part II A.
117 See text accompanying note 98.
114
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many measures the U.S. government directed at Arabs and Muslims after September 11 estranged these communities, thereby
damaging the nation's efforts to collect necessary intelligence.
Besides raising serious questions over their legality, overbroad
immigration measures that lack procedural safeguards appear to
be discriminatory, fail to improve security, and are, at best, counterproductive.
Again, narrower exclusions and better tracking of noncitizens would do much to calm the public and inspire confidence
in the immigration laws and their enforcement. The public does
not have faith in the current system in terms of effective enforcement, fairness, and safety. It is the worst of all worlds, engendering little confidence and respect, lacking legitimacy with
the public at large, and not working effectively.
3. Respecting civil rights.
The United States needs immigration laws and policies that
respect American constitutional traditions. It unfortunately is
often relatively easy for government, as well as the general public, to lash out at immigrants in times of national tragedy, 118 just
as occurred after the events of September 11, 2001. This nation
has a history of unfairly and harshly treating immigrants at precisely such times. 119 Our children's history books, I believe, will
record the nation's treatment of Arabs and Muslims after the
horrible events of September 11 as fitting in well with the more
120
unsavory episodes of U.S. immigration history.
Future security measures that employ the immigration laws
should scrupulously respect civil rights, avoid the appearance of
impermissible racial profiling, and strive to be calculated, discerning, and rational, rather than arbitrary, capricious, and
overbroad. Security measures in the immigration laws that appear measured and reasonable will help generate public confidence in the enforcement of those laws, confidence that is sorely
lacking in today's counterterrorism efforts. Again, narrower exclusions that allow law-abiding workers to more easily enter the
118 See Jonathan H. Marks, 9/11 + 3/11 + 7/7 = ?: What Counts in Counterterrorism,
37 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 559 (2006) (analyzing psychological pressures on society leading to overreactions in times of social stress); Adrian Vermeule, LibertarianPanics, 36
Rutgers L J 871 (2005) (studying how law often cannot restrain the excesses of a society
in a panic).
119 See text accompanying note 79.
120 Id.
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United States, combined with better tracking of all immigrants,
would demonstrate the requisite respect for the civil rights of
citizens and noncitizens.
CONCLUSION

With time, the jitters generated in the United States by the
horrors of September 11, 2001 will fade. Indeed, as a nation,
emotions have calmed noticeably over the last few years. After
an exclusive focus on strict anti-terrorism measures, the United
States returned to serious consideration of immigration reform in
2005.121 However, none of the reform proposals on the table, then
or now, in my estimation, would do much to regularize the migration between the United States and Mexico on a long-term
basis, or to stem the rampant violation of the immigration laws.
They instead at most offer short term "solutions" and purported
quick fixes that will likely necessitate reform efforts in a matter
of years. Most importantly, such half-baked solutions will result
in, ten to twenty years from now, a new undocumented immigrant population of millions clamoring for legalization.
The United States needs and deserves immigration laws
that recognize that the migration from the south into this country has been continuous over many generations and is spurred by
economic opportunity and the desire for family reunification.
Given the economic, political, and social realities of the situation,
including the economic disparities between the United States
and Mexico, the flow of migrants to this country does not appear
to have an immediate end in sight.
When the appropriate time comes, this nation will hopefully
engage the serious challenges posed by the great demand for labor migration and embark on regularizing the flow of labor from
Mexico into the United States. 122 Only true comprehensive reform that allows for the admission of significantly larger numbers of labor migrants-not the incremental reform floated about
in Congress over the last few years-will diminish the incentives
for illegal immigration and minimize the tragic human costs re121 See Hing, Deporting Our Souls at 8-51 (cited in note 16) (summarizing various
reform proposals).
122 A North American Union modeled on the European Union that permitted labor
migration between Canada, Mexico, and the United State is one possible approach. See T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Legal Immigration Reform: Toward Rationality and Equity, in
Richard D. Lamm and Alan Simpson, eds, Blueprints For An Ideal Legal Immigration
Policy 5, 5-6 (Center for Immigration Studies 2001).
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nature of current immigration

laws. 123
In this era of globalization, the United States requires a system of immigration admissions that better comports with social,
political, and economic factors contributing to immigration than
does the current broken immigration system. At a most fundamental level, the nation needs immigration laws that discourage
migrants from entering the country unlawfully and the creation
of a large undocumented immigrant population. It also needs to
better track noncitizens residing in the country. The history of
failed border enforcement suggests that just adding more and
more border enforcement, including additional Border Patrol officers and technology, more detention facilities, and extending
the border fence, will not result in diminishing the undocumented immigrant population in the United States.
Although it is not strictly an immigration concern, national
security is unquestionably an issue in which immigration and
immigrant policy can play a role. The possibilities for meaningful
reform that addresses security as well as economic goals of immigration law and enforcement, are numerous and have not been
analyzed in detail in this article.1 24 At a most fundamental level,
the United States needs more realistic immigration laws. 125
National security unfortunately has come to dominate discussion of immigration law and enforcement, as well as the
thorny topic of immigration reform. 126 The central contention of
this article is that a more liberal immigration admission system
is entirely consistent with the interests of the United States in
protecting itself from another terrorist attack, a goal shared by
virtually all residents-citizens and noncitizens-of this country.
123 See Part II A.

124 For discussion of the possibility of issuing driver's licenses to undocumented immigrants, which would allow for better identification of residents, see Kevin R. Johnson,
Driver'sLicenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The Future of Civil Rights Law?, 5 Nev
L J 213 (2004). Consider also Maria Pab6n Lopez, More Than A License to Drive: State
Restrictions on the Use of Driver's Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 SIU L J 91 (2004-05); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Missouri, the "War on Terrorism,"and Immigrants:Legal Challenges
Post 9/11, 67 Mo L Rev 775, 798-807 (2002) (analyzing controversy in Missouri over
driver's license eligibility for undocumented immigrants). On the need for better tracking
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Unfortunately, the current system, which has contributed to a
shadow population in the country of millions of people, makes
little sense from the standpoint of national security and public
safety. Rather, the United States would do better to embrace
immigration laws in which the admission of immigrants better
approximates the demand for immigrant labor. Such a law would
be both better for the national economy and for national security.

